This is part 2 of a
5-part report which attempts to detail a history of the rise of ISIS and to
explain its true relations to the actors involved in the war theatre. It
attempts to show how and why ISIS has been exploited while attempting to answer
the question: what has been the groups’ ultimate purpose in relation to the
dominant powers manipulating the proxy conflict. Then, given what is known
historically, it hopes to shed light on what the motivations are behind the
current actions against the group and what purpose they serve.
The “Moderate” Jihad in Syria
Syria was externally targeted because the US and its allies
saw it as strategically beneficial to organize and foster an armed insurgency
which could eventually become capable of overturning the government. The most
prominent aspect of this being the attempt to create a “Free Syrian Army” of
opposition fighters which could be displayed as the respectable and indigenous
face of the insurgency and help sell the intervention to the Western public.
Helping to hide the foreign hand behind the militants, the
rebel arming program was only officially announced in 2013, yet in reality
began almost two years prior, at least as early as October 2011 after the fall
of Gaddafi in Libya, but likely even much earlier.1 Also dispelling
the illusion that these FSA groups were solely a native development, it was
revealed in late 2011 that US Special Operations Forces were on the ground and
privately discussing to themselves how “there isn’t much of a Free Syrian Army
to train right now”, the groups only later gaining prominence as a result of
the foreign interference.2
Indeed, by this time knowledgeable academics such as
Columbia University’s Joseph Massad were writing that the “[Arab] League and
imperial powers have taken over the Syrian uprising in order to remove the
al-Assad regime”, while the West’s best journalists would later characterize
the program by saying “the impression one gets is of a movement wholly
controlled by Arab and Western intelligence agencies.”3
Corroborating much of this, a former rebel explained to the Wall Street Journal how the insurgency
was largely being directed from abroad, saying that “decisions weren’t always
being made at the local level.” Instead, it was “the Salafists from Gulf nations…
and the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey” who would “send money to certain groups
and then orchestrate attacks from afar.”4
Concurrently, great efforts were made to portray the FSA as
an entirely independent outfit and to separate Western involvement from the
extremist groups that were beginning to form. However, apart from whatever the rebels
would tell the Western press, the reality on the ground was that there was
never any division between the FSA and groups like al-Qaeda, the Islamists
having been welcomed from the very start.5 For instance, the founder
of the FSA, Syrian army defector Riad el-Asaad, described al-Qaeda as “our
brothers in Islam”, while another rebel commander, a main recipients of US aid,
admitted that his organizations was very much alike al-Qaeda and that the two
groups fought alongside each other. Al-Qaeda did not, he said, “exhibit any
abnormal behavior, which is different from that of the FSA.”6 So
while US officials maintained that they only supported “moderates”, journalist
Patrick Cockburn gets much closer to the truth, explaining that “it is here
that there was a real intention to deceive”, because “in reality, there is no
dividing wall between them [ISIS and al-Qaeda] and America’s supposedly
moderate opposition allies.”7
Also troubling for
the oppositions’ image, the “moderate” nature of the US vetted groups soon
began to unravel, the FSA consistently being described as even worse than the
groups who are commonly associated with extremism. While Department of Defense
officials were aware that the “vast majority of moderate Free Syrian Army
rebels were in fact, Islamist militants”, counterterrorism specialists
explained that the “undisciplined and brutal behavior of the FSA stood in
contrast to the much more disciplined Jabhat
Al-Nusra.” Indeed, the British press described this brutal behavior in
terms of their “looting and banditry”, explaining that “the FSA has now become
a largely criminal enterprise” as they have been primarily focused on
“profiteering, gun-running, and the extracting of tolls from road checkpoints.”8
Also quite troubling, being enmeshed with the other fighters
the FSA had soon assumed the de-facto function of serving as a weapons conduit
to the extremists. While it was later confirmed that at least half of all
supplies given to the “moderates” were duly handed over to al-Qaeda,9
multiple court cases earlier revealed that arms shipments received by the FSA
would be unloaded and distributed quite indiscriminately to whoever was
fighting nearby. Helping to explain this, former MI6 agent Alastair Crooke
pointed out that “the West does not actually hand the weapons to al-Qaeda, let
alone ISIS… but the system that they have constructed leads precisely to that
end.” This is because the weapons shipments given to the FSA “have been
understood to be a sort of ‘Wal Mart’ from which the more radical groups would
be able to take their weapons and pursue the jihad”, as weapons always migrated
“along the line to the more radical elements.”10
This wasn’t something that the Western backers of the
opposition just turned a blind eye to, instead such cooperation with jihadists
was explicitly ordered by them on multiple occasions, usually when the
extremists were needed to win battlefield victories. In 2014, for example, a
CIA-backed commander explained that “if the people who support us [the US and
its allies] tell us to send weapons to another group, we send them. They asked
us a month ago to send weapons to [hard-line Islamists] in Yabroud so we sent a
lot of weapons there.”
On a separate occasion, US-led operations rooms
“specifically encouraged a closer cooperation with Islamists commanding
frontline operations” during the conquest of Idlib, the supervision given by US
military intelligence operatives being “instrumental in facilitating their
[Islamists’] involvement.”11
Enter the Proxies
Having successfully kept most of this hidden from view,
focus on the FSA program helped to distract from the wider reality that the US
and its allies were supporting the entire opposition indiscriminately.
It has long been known that states like Qatar had been
supporting both al-Qaeda and ISIS,12 their own deputy foreign
minister openly stating “I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage,
or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as al-Qaeda given Qatar’s
perceived necessity of removing al-Assad at all costs.” As well, al-Qaeda’s
Syria franchise themselves admitted that they “get money from the Gulf” with
their “great name.”13
Also widely known is that Saudi Arabia and Turkey both had
intimate ties with al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the rest of the other radical jihadists.
Far from trying to hide these connections, both countries had in fact openly
supported a rebel coalition that was dominated by al-Qaeda.14 Yet in
reality this was all undertaken in cooperation with the United States or with
their implicit blessing.
Getting to the heart of the matter, an extensive
investigation by Foreign Policy’s
Elizabeth Dickenson uncovered that not only had Qatar gotten “such freedom to run
its network for the last three years because Washington was looking the other
way,” but that “in fact, in 2011, the US gave Doha de facto free rein to do
what it wasn’t willing to do.”15 White House officials explained that
“Syria is [Qatar’s] backyard”, while academics similarly concluded “there is no
chance that Qatar is doing this alone.”16
Indeed, the weapons shipments coming from Qatar had been
conducted in conjunction with the CIA, who US officials confirm acted in a
“consultant role.”17 In the case of Saudi Arabia, whose former
foreign minister himself admitted that it was the Saudi monarchy who created
ISIS, stating “Daesh [ISIS] is our [Sunni] response to your support for the
Da’wa [Iran-aligned Shia ruling party of Iraq]”,18 their involvement
was also conducted jointly with the US. The terms of this arrangement, revealed
by The New York Times, was that the
Saudis would provide large sums of money and weapons and in exchange would be
granted a seat at the table and have a say as to which groups would be
supported, while the CIA would coordinate such shipments and help train the
fighters.19 Seemingly finding no objections from their US partners,
we now know that they and other Gulf allies were the ones “who fund [ISIS]”, as
was revealed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in congressional
testimony.20 Similarly, while it was revealed that Turkey’s intimate
coordination with ISIS was “undeniable”,21 in fact evidence suggests
the country’s weapons shipments were largely conducted in cooperation with CIA
officers and US officials,22 cooperation which continued even as it
was revealed that Turkey was collaborating with ISIS and allowing substantial
tracts of its territory to remain open to the group.23
Honest reporters therefore correctly categorized the US’
involvement by explaining that “the U.S. in many ways is acting in Syria
through proxies, primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates”,
while Turkey was “taking the lead as U.S. proxy.”24 Western
officials however began to publicly distance themselves from this involvement,
claiming the “US had growing concerns that, just as in Libya, the Qataris are
equipping some of the wrong militants.” This was worrying because “this has the
potential to go badly wrong… [because of] the risk that weapons will end up in
the hands of violent anti-Western Islamists.”25 Yet as Christopher
Davison explains, whom the Economist describes as “one of the most
knowledgeable academics writing about the region”, this was all an attempt to
“establish some distance” between the US and its allies in the Gulf, “so as to
insulate themselves from any possible fallout from such risky moves.”26
Describing the true relationship, a former advisor to one of
the Gulf states explained that the reason the US did not try to stop nations
like Qatar from delivering weapons to extremists was simply because “they
didn’t want to.”27
The reason the Western powers were supporting such virulent
elements was actually quite simple. Besides having a well-documented history of
supporting jihadist networks against their enemies,28 the most
radical groups taking part in the Syria conflict were as well the best and most
effective fighters. Joshua Landis, a US academic and specialist on Syria,
explained that the “radicals got money because they were successful. They
fought better, had better strategic vision and were more popular.”29
Helping to explain the thought process further, prominent think-tank analysts
actually recommended supporting al-Qaeda under the basis that they bring “discipline,
religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers
in the Gulf,” and most importantly, “deadly results.”30
Therefore, as former British diplomat Alastair Crooke
explains, the operative idea was to “use jihadists to weaken the government in
Damascus and to drive it to its knees to the negotiating table.”31
Notes:
1.)
Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “U.S.
to Give Some Syria Rebels Ability to Call Airstrikes,” Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2015.; Judicial Watch, “Defense,
State Department Documents Reveal Obama Administration Knew that al Qaeda
Terrorists Had Planned Benghazi Attack 10 Days in Advance,” 18 May 2015.;
Seymour M. Hersh, “The
Red Line and the Rat Line,” London
Review of Books,” 17 April 2014.
2.)
The Free
Syrian Army never had a central command structure, it always referred to a
myriad of disparate groups using the label as a brand name, but the FSA has
also become a euphemism for describing any CIA supported and/or vetted groups. WikiLeaks, “INSIGHT - military
intervention in Syria, post withdrawal status of forces”, cable released on
6 March 2012.; Aron Lund speculates that when the FSA was created in July 2011
it could have been the product of a Turkish intelligence operation. Aron Lund,
“The
Free Syrian Army Doesn’t Exist,” Syria
Comment, March 16, 2013.
3.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, p. 320. Citing Joseph Massad, “The
struggle for Syria,” Al Jazeera, 15
November 2011.; Patrick Cockburn, The
Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution, p. 86.
4.)
Raja Abdulrahim, “Former
Syrian Rebel Mourns Uprising’s Failure,” Wall Street Journal, 26 January 2016.
5.)
“Some rebel units around Damascus, which had
earlier given themselves Islamic-sounding names to attract Saudi and Gulf
financing, opportunistically switched to more secular-sounding titles in a bid
to attract American support”, Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State, p. 26.; Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, p. 335, 336.
6.)
Bill Roggio, “Free
Syrian Army commander praises al Nusrah Front as ‘brothers’,” Long War Journal, 30 March 2013.; Joshua
Landis, “US Key Man in Syria Worked Closely with ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra,” https://twitter.com/joshua_landis/status/504610185952784384.
7.)
Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State, p. 3.
8.) Christopher
Davidson, Shadow Wars, pp. 334-336.
Citing Nafeez Ahmed, “Islamic
State is the cancer of modern capitalism,” Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015, and counterterrorism expert A.
Hashim, “The Islamic state: from Al-Qaeda affiliate to caliphate”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 21, No. 4,
2014, p. 7, and Ruth Sherlock, “Syria
dispatch: from band of brothers to princes of war,” Daily Telegraph, 30 November 2013.
10.)
Comments made by Alastair Crooke, “Al Qaeda in Syria,” BBC, 17 December 2015.; Richard
Norton-Taylor, “Terror
trial collapses after fears of deep embarrassment to security services,” Guardian, 1 June 2015.
11.)
Isabel Hunter, “'I
am not fighting against al-Qa’ida… it’s not our problem', says West’s last hope
in Syria,” The Independent, 2 April 2015. No longer available,
archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20140406105449/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/i-am-not-fighting-againstalqaida-itsnot-our-problem-says-wests-last-hope-in-syria-9233424.html.;
Charles Lister, “Why Assad is
losing,” Brookings, 5 May 2015.; Nafeez
Ahmed, “Endless
enemies – how the US is supporting the Islamic State by fighting it,” Middle East Eye, 17 July 2015.
12.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, p. 322, 456. Citing US Navy admiral and former NATO
supreme commander James Stavridis, “the biggest share of the individual
donations supporting the Islamic State and the most radical groups comes from
Qatar,” NBC News, “Who’s
Funding ISIS? Wealthy Gulf Angel Investors, Officials Say”, 21 September
2014.
13.)
Ibid., p. 322. Citing Elizabeth Dickenson, “The Case
Against Qatar,” Foreign Policy,
30 September 2014, and Weiss, ISIS:
Inside the Army of Terror, p. 100.
14.)
Desmond Butler, “Turkey
Officials Confirm Pact With Saudi Arabia to Help Rebels Fighting Syria’s Assad,”
Huffington Post, 7 May 2015. No longer available,
archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20150508173130/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/07/turkey-saudi-arabia-syria-rebels-pact_n_7232750.html.; For further information on Saudi Arabia and
Turkey’s support, see Christopher Davidson, Shadow
Wars, pp. 324-26, 453-67.
15.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, p. 321. Citing Elizabeth Dickenson, “The Case
Against Qatar,” Foreign Policy,
30 September 2014.
16.)
Ibid., pp. 321-22. Citing Mark Mazzetti, C. J.
Chivers and Eric Schmitt, “Taking
Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels,” New York Times, 29 June 2013, and David Roberts of King’s College
London, , “Is
Qatar bringing the Nusra Front in from the cold?”, BBC Online, 6 March 2015.
17.)
Ibid., p.324. Citing Mark Mazzetti, et al., “Taking
Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels,” New York Times, 29 June 2013.
19.)
Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S.
Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels,” New York Times, 23 January 2016.
21.)
Martin Chulov, “Turkey
sends in jets as Syria’s agony spills over every border,” Guardian, 26 July 2015.; Nafeez Ahmed, “NATO
is harbouring the Islamic State,” Insurge
Intelligence, 19 November 2015.; For further corroboration of Turkish
complicity, see Christopher Davidson, Shadow
Wars, pp. 461-67.
22.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, pp. 466-67. Citing Eric Schmitt, “CIA
Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syria Opposition,” New York Times, 21 June 2012.; Fehim Tastekin, “Turkish
military says MIT shipped weapons to al-Qaeda,” Al-Monitor, 15 January 2015.; “Syria-bound trucks put spotlight on
Turkey,” Al-Monitor, 21 January
2014.; Ruth Sherlock, “Fears
that US weapons will fall into al-Qaeda’s hands as Syrian rebels defect,” Daily Telegraph, 11 November 2014.
23.)
Ibid., p. 461-62.
24.)
Jay Solomon and Nour Malas, “U.S.
Bolsters Ties to Fighters in Syria,” Wall
Street Journal, 13 June 2012.; Philip Giraldi, “NATO vs.
Syria,” American Conservative, 19
December 2011.
25.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, pp. 324-25. Citing James Risen, et al., “US-Approved
Arms for Libya Rebels Fell into Jihadis’ Hands,” New York Times, 5 December 2012.; Adam Entous, et al., “A
Veteran Saudi Power Player Works to Build Support to Topple Assad,” Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2013.
26.)
Ibid., p. 325.
28.)
Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars, pp. 85-176.; Nafeez Ahmed, “Islamic
State is the cancer of modern capitalism,” Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015.
29.)
John Judis, “America’s
Failure – and Russia and Iran’s Success – in Syria’s Cataclysmic Civil War,”
TPM, 10 January 2017.
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