This is part 3 of a 5
part report which attempts to detail a history of the rise of ISIS and to
explain its true relations to the actors involved in the war theatre. It
attempts to show how and why ISIS has been exploited while also answering the
question: what has been the group’s
ultimate purpose in relation to the dominant powers manipulating the proxy
conflict. Given what is known historically, it hopes to shed light on what the
motivations are behind the current actions against the group, as well as what
purpose they serve.
A Salafist Principality for the West
As the opposition became increasingly sectarian, it was
apparent that it was the militant elements and their “deadly results”1
which drove out and supplanted the real moderates.
A leading figure in the early uprisings, Haytham Manna
criticized the negative impact that external intervention had on the protest
movement. Writing in The Guardian in
2012, he explained that the main effect of taking up arms was to “undermine the
broad popular support necessary to transform the uprising into a democratic
revolution.” Furthermore, it was the eventual “pumping of arms to Syria [from]
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the phenomenon of the Free Syrian Army, and the entry
of more than 200 jihadi foreigners… [that] have all led to a decline in the
mobilization of large segments of the population… and in the activists’
peaceful civil movement.” The net result of this being that “the political
discourse has become sectarian; there has been a Salafisation of religiously
conservative sectors.”2
Going a way to back up this view, Vice President Biden
succinctly admitted that in terms of finding “moderates”, in reality “there was
no moderate middle because the moderate middle are made up of shopkeepers, not
soldiers.” The shopkeepers and reformists being sidelined as the West’s allies,
in Biden’s view, “poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands
of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad, except that the
people who were being supplied were al-Nusra and al-Qaeda and the extremist
elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.”3
The realization in the White House was that if they
realistically wanted their policy to have any success they would have to
empower those capable of producing results. “This idea,” Obama remarked, “that
we could provide some light arms or even more sophisticated arms to what was
essentially an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists and so
forth,” in other words, the moderate forces, “and that they were going to be
able to battle not only a well-armed state but also a well-armed state backed
by Russia, backed by Iran, a battle-hardened Hezbollah, was never in the cards.”4 Instead,
as investigative journalist Gareth Porter explains, the US would have to accept
“a tacit reliance on the jihadists to achieve [their] objective of putting
sufficient pressure on the Assad regime to force some concessions on Damascus.”
Obama would have to “hide the reality that it was complicit in a strategy of arming
[al-Qaeda]” by maintaining the illusion that an independent “moderate”
opposition existed, as this would be “necessary to provide a political fig leaf
for the covert and indirect U.S. reliance on Al Qaeda’s Syria franchise’s
military success.”5
Indeed, not only was this all well understood by planners,
the true extent of the empowerment of extremists was known to decision makers
from the beginning. The CIA, for instance, very early on was informing the
President in classified assessments that “most of the arms shipped at the
behest of Saudi Arabia and Qatar” were “going to hard-line Islamic jihadists,
and not the more secular opposition.”6 The man described as the CIA’s
“eyes and ears on the ground” in Syria, tasked with drawing up plans for regime
change after spending a year meeting with rebels, concluded from his journey
that in fact, “there were no moderates.”7
Even earlier the Defense Intelligence Agency was warning
officials that events on the ground “are taking a clear sectarian direction”
and left no doubt as to who was heading the opposition, stating “the Salafists,
the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency.”
Most remarkably, this 2012 report had predicted the rise of ISIS a full two
years before it occurred, stating that “if the situation unravels there is the
possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in
eastern Syria.” Far from being undesired, in terms of the West, Gulf countries,
and Turkey, the report said “this is exactly what the supporting powers to the
opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime.”8
Heading the DIA at the time, Michael Flynn confirmed the
validity of this report, explaining that he “paid very close attention… the
intelligence was very clear.”9 Not only that, he confirmed that his
agency sent a constant stream of classified warnings to the White House about
these and other predictions, saying that the jihadists were in control of the
opposition and that toppling Assad would have dire consequences. By 2013 the
assessments were saying that the US’ covert effort “had morphed into an
across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the
opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. The so-called
moderates had evaporated… and the US was arming extremists.”
But instead of heeding these warnings there was “enormous
pushback” from the Obama administration, Flynn explaining that “I felt that
they did not want to hear the truth.” Indeed, according to a Joint Chiefs of
Staff advisor, there simply was “no way to stop the arms shipments that had
been authorized by the president.” Even though, Flynn said, “if the American
public saw the intelligence we were producing daily, at the most sensitive
level, they would go ballistic.”10
When asked if this obstinacy was a result of mere negligence
on the part of the civilian administration, remarkably Flynn replied “I don’t
think they turned a blind eye, I think it was a decision. I think it was a
willful decision.” Asked to clarify if he meant the US government deliberately
decided to support extremist groups and the founding of a Salafist
principality, Flynn stood firm and said “it was a willful decision to do what
they’re doing.”11
Former MI6 agent Alastair Crooke later attempted to shed
some light on the strategic thinking behind all of this. He explained that the
idea “of breaking up the large Arab states into ethnic and sectarian enclaves”
had been “established group think” at least as far back as 2006, and that this
idea had been “given new life by the desire to pressure Assad in the wake of
the 2011 insurgency launched against the Syrian state.” The idea being to drive
“a Sunni ‘wedge’ into the landline linking Iran to Syria”, and thereby fracture
the connection between Iran and its Arab allies.12
Following along with much of what Biden, Obama, and others
had said about the inability to find moderates and the necessity of relying
upon extremists, Crooke concluded that “the
jihadification of the Syrian conflict had been a ‘willful’ policy decision, and
that since Al Qaeda and the ISIS embryo were the only movements capable of
establishing such a Caliphate across Syria and Iraq, then it plainly followed
that the U.S. administration, and its allies, tacitly accepted this outcome, in
the interests of weakening, or of overthrowing, the Syrian state.”13
A Useful Pretext
Much effort has been made to portray ISIS as antagonistic to
US interests and to place blame for its rise on official enemies. This is not
surprising given the near-unanimous outrage that the group elicited after
emerging on the world stage. However, outside of being a useful ideological
construct, this analysis neglects some very fundamental characteristics
inherent to the situation.
Apart from the obvious conspiracy theories there is of
course evidence that after ISIS was founded in 2014 it had made a sort of
compact with Bashar al-Assad’s government. After gaining access to documents of
a former deputy to Baghdadi, Der Spiegel
uncovered what appeared to be an agreement between ISIS and Syria’s Ba’ath regime. The nature of the
agreement was an understanding that Syria’s air force would not strike ISIS and
in return ISIS commanders promised to order their fighters not to fire on
Syrian army soldiers. This made sense for ISIS since its immediate goal was to
gain supremacy over Sunni areas while the Syrian army was, as well, primarily
concentrated on the immediate threats that it faced from other groups further
west. It was in the interests of both sides to avoid a mutually assured destruction
with each other.14
The problem with taking this too far is that after ISIS had
consolidated its hold over Raqqa and gained supremacy over much of the other
rebel groups this understanding appeared to have dissolved, ISIS then mounting
an assault against the Syrian army at Al-Tabqa airbase and executing more than
160 Syrian soldiers. Since that point,
ISIS has been in a constant state of war with the Syrian army, despite many
attempts by regime-change supporters to claim otherwise.15
These kinds of arguments seem to miss an even larger aspect
of the bigger picture and misinterpret the motivation of the various players
involved. A truer picture of the situation is perhaps best exemplified by the
dilemma that faced the Western powers as the public became increasingly aware
of ISIS’ atrocities and began calling for some kind of a response to be made
against the group. As Western officials had portrayed ISIS as a grave threat to
Western civilization, there was great pressure on them to put their money where
their mouth was and act. However, this put them in an awkward position.
For one thing, in terms of breaking up an enemy state into
sectarian enclaves, ISIS had indeed proven quite efficient. It was also
emerging as the strongest opponent to Assad and had accomplished much in the
way of weakening the Syrian state, while, as well, driving an effective ‘Sunni
wedge’ between Iran and its’ allies. Problematically then, as Christopher
Davidson explains, “the Islamic State was effectively on the same side as the
West, especially in Syria, and in all its other warzones was certainly in the
same camp as the West’s regional allies.” Moreover, “on a strategic level, its
big gains had made it by far the best battlefield asset to those who sought the
permanent dismemberment of Syria and the removal of Nouri Maliki in Iraq.”
The trick, therefore, was “trying to find the right balance
between being seen to take action but yet still allowing the Islamic State to
prosper.”16
The response was an airstrike campaign aimed primarily at
delineating boundaries that the group was not allowed to cross, mainly around
the US’ own allies. This campaign also served as a useful opportunity to
establish a military presence in Syria which otherwise would not have been
manageable. After all, who would object to such an operation when it was being
targeted against such a horrific barbarity as the Islamic State?
After having done nothing to stop the previous sectarian
massacres that ISIS had committed, the US decided to launch its’ campaign when
it appeared that the Yazidi’s in Iraq were about to face an imminent genocide
at the hands of the advancing jihadists. While the mission was portrayed as a
selfless rescue mission necessary to break a debilitating siege that ISIS had
inflicted upon the Yazidis, in reality Kurdish fighters had already arrived on
the scene days before the US got there and had begun the process of evacuating
the civilians from the area.17
The real reason the US launched the mission was because ISIS
was advancing towards the nearby Kurdish capital of Irbil which represents a
key US client and area of extraction for Western energy companies. Apart from
Western oil interests being heavily invested in the exploitation of the area’s
natural resources, it also houses Israeli and US intelligence and military
operatives conducting anti-Syrian, anti-Iranian, and other regional operations.18
Yet the main strategic purpose of this US alliance with Iraqi Kurdistan has
been to make sure that the regime in Baghdad stayed in line; one CIA memorandum
stating that the Iraqi Kurds are a “uniquely useful tool for weakening Iraq’s
potential”, as well as a “card to play” against the Iraqi state.19
Therefore, far removed from the very public displays of
humanitarian concern, Obama explained that the US would “take action if [ISIS]
threatens our facilities anywhere in Iraq… including Irbil”, and made good on
his promise that airstrikes would be launched “should they move toward” the
Kurdish capital.20
The analogous delineation of boundaries in Syria occurred a
few months later when the US launched airstrikes to help defend the Kurdish
enclave of Kobane from a similar assault by the Islamic State, the Syrian Kurds
fast becoming a useful US ally on the ground. A highly-publicized spectacle, these
airstrikes helped to solidify the legitimacy of the illegal bombing campaign.
However, it was never apparent how crucial the US’ assistance actually was, or
if the bulk of the city’s defense hadn’t already been secured by the towns
battle-hardened fighters.21
Nevertheless, these pretexts proved useful. In one sense,
they allowed the West to appear responsive to public demands for action, while,
at the same time, allowing Western aircraft to conduct a de-facto no-fly-zone
over ISIS territory in Syria. There was a real danger that states genuinely committed
to the protection of the Syrian government, notably Iran but possibly Russia,
would take matters into their own hands and actually try to eradicate the
Islamic State. In this sense, the US-led campaign was useful in portraying the
image of US commitment to defeating ISIS while insuring, as well, that no other
state would defeat the group before their use had been exhausted and the West
could claim that symbolic victory for themselves.22
Notes:
1.)
Council on
Foreign Relations, “Al-Qaeda’s Specter in Syria”, 6 August 2012.
2.)
Guardian,
“Syria's opposition has been led astray by violence”, 22 June 2012.
3.)
P. Cockburn, The
Rise of Islamic State, pp. xix-xx.
4.)
New York
Times, “Obama on the World”, 8 August 2014.
5.)
Consortium
News, “Obama’s ‘Moderate’ Syrian Deception”, 16 February 2016.
8.) Department of Defense, "Information Report 14-L-0552/DIA", August 2012 (subpoenaed), pp. 287-93.
9.)
Al Jazeera,
“Head to Head: Who is to blame for the rise of ISIL”, 29 July 2015.
10.)
London
Review of Books, “Military to Military”, 7 January 2016.
11.)
Al Jazeera,
“Head to Head: Who is to blame for the rise of ISIL”, 29 July 2015.
12.)
Huffington
Post, “If Syria and Iraq Become Fractured, So Too Will Tripoli and North
Lebanon”, 1 June 2015.
13.)
Consortium
News, “Lost on the ‘Dark Side’ in Syria”, 17 November 2015.
14.)
C. Davidson, Shadow
Wars, pp. 391-92. Citing Der Spiegel,
“The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State”, 18
April 2015.
15.)
Ibid., pp. 392-93. Citing Daily Star, “ISIS seizes last Syrian regime base in Raqqa
province”, 25 August 2014. Channel NewsAsia, “IS executes more than 160 Syria
troops in new atrocity”, 28 August 2014.
16.)
Ibid., pp. 421-22.
17.)
Ibid., p. 423. Citing New York Times, “Despite US Claims, Yazidis Say Crisis is Not
Over”, 14 August 2014. Washington Post,
“Why can’t the US figure out how many Yazidis are on Mount Sinjar?”, 15 August
2014.; Gulf News, “Kurds unite to
oust Iraq jihadists, rescue stranded civilian”, 6 August 2014.
18.)
The New
Yorker, “Plan B”, 28 June 2004. CNBC,
“Iraqi Kurdistan-focused oil shares hit by IS advance”, 7 August 2014.
RiskAdvisory, “Security in Iraqi Kurdistan – between perception and reality”,
18 September 2014.
19.)
C. Davidson, Shadow
Wars, p. 424. Citing William Blum, Killing
Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, p. 243.
20.)
Washington
Post, “U.S. airstrikes target Islamic State militants in northern Iraq”, 8
August 2014.
21.)
C. Davidson, Shadow
Wars, p. 431.
22.)
Ibid., p. 428.
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